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I. Introduction  
This paper is about the administrative practices of a public institution, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). The principles of good governance require that the IMF’s administrative practices 
should promote both efficient and effective IMF operations and the accountability of IMF staff 
and management3. The administrative practices can only promote accountability if they satisfy 
two conditions. First, the institution’s stakeholders and the staff and management themselves 
must be able to determine if the staff and management’s conduct conforms to the appropriate 
standards for measuring their performance. These standards can be divided into two categories. 
The first,  which can be termed operational policies, establish the substantive requirements that 
the staff and management must meet in implementing the institution’s policies. Examples of 
operational policies are the World Bank’s environmental assessment requirements4 and the 
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) guidelines on conditionality5.  The second, which can be 
called operational procedures, explain how the staff and management of the institution should go 
about making decisions and conducting its operations. Examples of operational procedures are 
the steps that World Bank staff must take in conducting environmental assessments6 and the 
IMF’s guidance note on the guidelines on conditionality7. This second category is comparable to 
administrative procedures in national legal systems.  
The second condition is that the institution must have some mechanism for dealing with cases of 
staff or management non-compliance with the applicable operational policies and procedures and 
the consequences thereof. Examples of mechanisms established for this purpose include 
ombudsmen, administrative tribunals and inspection mechanisms, like the World Bank 
Inspection Panel. 
1 DO NOT QUOTE OR PUBLISH WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHOR OR CENTRE FOR GLOBAL 
STUDIES.
2 Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, American University Washington 
College of Law, Washington D.C. Email: bradlow@american.edu
3 For a general overview of IMF governance, see, L. van Houtven, Governance of the IMF: Decision 
Making, Institutional Oversight, Transparency and Accountability (IMF Pamphlet Series #53, 2002)
4 World Bank, Operational Manual, Volume II, Safeguard Policies, Operational Policy (OP) 4.01: 
Environmental Assessment, 1999, available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/toc2/9367A2A9D9DAEED38525672
C007D0972?OpenDocument. 
5 International Monetary Fund, Guidelines on Conditionality, 2002, available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2002/eng/guid/092302.pdf.  
6 World Bank, Operational Manual, Volume II, Safeguard Policies, Bank Procedure (BP) 4.01: 
Environmental Assessment, 1999, available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/Institutional/Manuals/OpManual.nsf/ea5916efc9250d10852565af0054d273
/c4241d657823fd818525672c007d096e?OpenDocument
7 International Monetary Fund, Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines, available at
http://www.imf.org/External/np/pdr/cond/2003/eng/050803.htm.
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This paper examines how well the IMF’s administrative practices conform to this principle of 
good governance. It is divided into four sections. The first section is a review of the existing 
operational policies and procedures in the IMF and a comparison with the situation in the 
multilateral development banks (MDBs). The second section evaluates the feasibility of the IMF 
establishing a comprehensive set of operational procedures. The third section considers the case 
for establish a mechanism for holding the IMF staff and management accountable for their 
compliance with a comprehensive set of operational policies and procedures. The final section 
contains recommendations, based on the lessons learned in the previous sections of the paper. It 
recommends that the IMF develop a comprehensive set of formal operational policies and 
procedures and that it establish an ombudsman to deal with the problems created by staff and 
management non-compliance with these policies and procedures. 
II. The Current Situation in the IMF and Comparison with the MDBs  
A. Current Situation in the IMF
Operational policies and procedures are part of the “internal law” of an international 
organization. For current purposes, “internal law” refers to the combination of the constitutive 
documents of the organization and the rules and regulations that it develops to govern the way in 
which it implements its mandate. 
The IMF’s internal law consists of the following:
1. Articles of Agreement8: This is the international agreement, signed and ratified by all IMF 
member states, that establishes the powers and mandate of the IMF.  The issues addressed 
in the Articles include the purposes of the IMF; its powers to conduct surveillance, to 
provide financing to its member states and to issue SDRs; its governance structure; and 
the rights and obligations of IMF member states.
2. By-Laws9: The Board of Governors adopts these By-laws pursuant to its authority under 
the Articles of Agreement. They are intended to complement the Articles. They deal with 
such matters as the conduct of the meetings of the Executive Board and the Board of 
Governors, the appointment of Executive Directors, voting, the ability of members not 
entitled to appoint an Executive Director to be represented at meetings of the Executive 
Board, budgets, audits and membership issues. 
3. Rules and Regulations10: These “provide such operating rules and procedures, 
regulations, and interpretations as are necessary and desirable to carry out the purposes 
and powers contained in the Articles, as supplemented by the By-Laws.”11 The IMF has 
20 rules and regulations, each of which is identified by letter. They cover such issues as 
the meetings of the Executive Board, the mechanical aspects of transactions with the 
8 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, adopted July 22, 
1944, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa.pdf
9 International Monetary Fund, By-Laws of the International Monetary Fund, adopted March 16, 1946, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm. 
10 International Monetary Fund, Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund, adopted Sept. 
25, 1946, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/blcon.htm
11 International Monetary Fund, Rules and Regulations of the International Monetary Fund, Rule A-1, 
Scope of Rules and Regulations, adopted Sept. 25, 1946, amended April 1, 1978, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/bl/rr01.htm.
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IMF, accounting and reporting in the IMF, relations with non-member states, staff 
regulations and the operation of the SDR account. The rule dealing with staff is 
designated Rule-N. It covers such issues as appointment of staff, the fact that staff owe 
their loyalty “entirely” to the IMF, individual staff involvement in political affairs, 
publications by staff, the affirmation that staff make upon their appointment, staff 
grievances, and staff travel.
4. Decisions of the Board12: These are formal decisions of the Executive Board that establish 
clear policies for the IMF. They deal with such issues as the content of conditionality, 
Article IV consultations and the role of the IMF in governance. 
5. General Administrative Orders13: These are orders issued by management. They usually 
deal with personnel issues as opposed to operational issues. 
6. \Codes of Conduct14: The IMF has a code of conduct for its staff and management and a 
separate code for Executive Directors, Alternate Executive Directors and their Advisors. 
Both codes deal with ethical issues related to the problem of corruption. 
7. Guidance Documents: These are policy papers and guidance notes that set out the IMF’s 
policies on specific issues. Most of these documents are operational policy documents 
that are intended to provide guidance on the substance of IMF policy in regard to specific 
activities of the IMF or to specific issues relevant to IMF operations. An example of such 
a document is the IMF Guidelines on Conditionality15.  Recently, the IMF issued a 
guidance note to help staff implement the conditionality guidelines16. This is a rare 
example of a formal and publicly available IMF operational procedure. Most IMF 
operational procedures are informal and not publicly available. It is important to note it is 
unclear if these guidance documents establish binding standards and procedures for IMF 
staff or are merely precatory in intent. .
The internal law addresses four administrative issues with differing degrees of detail. The most 
detailed relates to the personnel policies of the IMF, including the rights and responsibilities of 
IMF employees. One indication of the importance that the IMF attaches to this issue is the 
number of mechanisms that it has established to “enforce” these personnel policies. This 
infrastructure, in addition, to less formal grievance procedures17, consists of the following 
elements:
1. Ombudsman18: The office of the Ombudsman deals with staff grievances. It seeks to 
investigate and then help resolve problems that arise between staff and management. 
2. Staff Association Committee19: This is a committee of the Staff Association and one of its 
functions is to advice staff on their rights and responsibilities and to assist in the 
resolution of cases of staff grievance with IMF management. 
12 International Monetary Fund, Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the IMF Twenty-Seventh 
Issue, December 31, 2002, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp
13 International Monetary Fund, Report of the External Panel, Review of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Dispute Resolution System, Nov. 27, 2001, available at http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/dr/112701.pdf. 
14 International Monetary Fund, Code of Conduct for Staff, July 31, 1998, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/code.htm; International Monetary Fund, Code of Conduct for Members of  
the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund, July 14, 2000, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/edscode.htm.
15 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra, note 4.
16 Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines,  supra note 6  . 
17 Review of the International Monetary Fund’s Dispute Resolution System, supra note 12.
18 International Monetary Fund, Ombudsperson's Terms of Reference, June 30, 1999, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm
19 Review of the International Monetary Fund’s Dispute Resolution System, supra note 12.
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3. Administrative Tribunal20: This is an independent tribunal on which legal experts who are 
not employees of the IMF serve on a part-time basis. The tribunal’s function is to hear 
formal complaints and grievances of employees of the IMF relating to their treatment by 
their managers and the IMF as an institution. The Tribunal has the power to overrule 
management and to provide complainants with compensation for the harm they have 
suffered and to order their re-instatement. 
4. Ethics Officer21: The IMF has appointed an Ethics Officer to advise all IMF officials on 
issues arising from the applicable code of conduct. 
These mechanisms support the internal law in three ways. First, they help educate staff about 
what their rights are and the standards with which they can expect their managers to conform. 
Second, they allow employment problems to be resolved in a way which is effective, impartial 
and based on the merits of the case. Third, their case records help the IMF learn lessons about the 
nature of the employment relationship in the institution and how to improve it. 
It is important to note that the IMF has established an infrastructure for implementing its 
personnel law that meets almost all the requirements for accountability mentioned at the 
beginning of this paper. It has clear policies and procedures, with the possible exception of a rule 
making process, and a mechanism for monitoring and enforcing compliance with these policies 
and procedures. Interestingly, this is the only part of the IMF internal law for which this 
observation is accurate. 
The second administrative issue is the rules and practices applicable to the governance of the 
IMF. These rules and practices deal with such issues as the election of Executive Directors, the 
conduct of Board of Governors’ and Executive Board meetings, and the accounting practices of 
the organization.  
The third issue addressed by the internal law is operational policies. The content of these policies 
is less detailed than the content of the law in regard to personnel matters. The mechanisms for 
“enforcing” this law are also less well developed.  Examples of IMF operational policies are the 
new conditionality guidelines22, and the policy documents on surveillance23, governance24 and 
poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs)25. Until recently the only IMF mechanism for 
monitoring compliance with these operational policies was the Policy Development and Review 
Department (PDR) of the IMF. It is interesting to note that PDR, whose staff are regular IMF 
employees, is responsible for both the development and the review of IMF policies and their 
20 International Monetary Fund, Administrative Tribunal (IMFAT), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/imfat/index.htm
21 International Monetary Fund, Ethics Officer - Terms of Reference, Feb. 28, 2000, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm
22 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra note 3.
23 International Monetary Fund, Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 03/50, April 10, 2003, Enhancing the 
Effectiveness of Surveillance: Operational Responses, the Agenda Ahead, and Next Steps, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0350.htm ;  International Monetary Fund, Surveillance: A 
Factsheet, April 2003, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm.
24 International Monetary Fund, The Role of the IMF in Governance Issues: Guidance Note, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/nb9715.htm#I2, International Monetary Fund, Good 
Governance: The IMF's Role, 1997, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf. 
25 International Monetary Fund, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP), last updated June 16, 2003, 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp
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implementation. There is an obvious conflict of interest between the policy development and 
policy review aspects of PDR’s work which has tended to undermine public confidence in the 
objectivity of PDR reviews of IMF operational policies. Recently, the IMF, in part to address this 
problem, established an Independent Evaluation Office26, which is independent of IMF 
management and reports directly to the Executive Board, to evaluate selected aspects of IMF 
operations. Consequently, to some extent it functions as a monitor of staff and management 
compliance with the applicable operational policies. 
The fourth and least developed area of the IMF’s internal law is its formal operational 
procedures. Two preliminary points must be made about this area of the internal law. 
First,  IMF “operational procedures” can be understood as referring to the way in which 
the staff  and management execute their responsibilities in IMF surveillance, financing, 
analytical, and technical assistance activities.  Second, the focus of this paper is on the 
establishment of formal operational procedures, which means that they have entered into 
force after a drafting and approval process that results in a Board level decision, and that 
they are publicly available. 
With one exception, the IMF does not have formal operational procedures. This exception is the 
operational guidance note that the IMF has adopted to assist staff in implementing the 
conditionality guidelines27. The IMF does have informal procedures in the form of memoranda 
and notes from management to the staff that provide guidance on how they should conduct IMF 
operations. These existing procedures are informal in the sense that they have not been presented 
for Board approval and are not contained in a publicly available document. One example of such 
an informal operational procedure, identified through references in published materials, is an 
operational guidance note on surveillance28. 
The lack of formal operational policies means, for example, that there are no publicly available 
documents that external stakeholders can consult to learn how the IMF decides with whom it 
should consult during surveillance operations or in designing its financing arrangements or its 
technical assistance programs or in its general analytical and policy work, how it organizes these 
consultations, or what factors the staff should consider in making specific types of decisions. In 
addition, there are no mechanisms that stakeholders can use to hold the IMF accountable for the 
way in which it implements the existing informal operational policies or the one formal policy. 
Thus, the internal law in regard to operational procedures fails to conform to either of the two 
standards for good administrative practices identified at the beginning of this paper. 
The IMF’s failure to develop comprehensive formal operational procedures can be explained. 
When the IMF was responsible for managing a system of relatively fixed exchange rates, it could 
limit its interactions in its member states to the financial and monetary authorities. This meant 
that there was a limited range of officials involved in these interactions.  In addition, the IMF 
26 International Monetary Fund, Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/ieo/index.htm. 
27 Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines, supra note 6. The IMF has undertaken a 
participatory process regarding its relations with civil society and it is possible that this process will result 
in a second formal operational procedure. 
28 Footnote 28 in Enhancing the Effectiveness of Surveillance: OperationalResponses, the Agenda Ahead 
and Next Steps, prepared by the Policy Development and Review Department in consultation with Other 
Departments (March 13, 2003) refers to an Operational Guidance Note for Staff Following the 2002 
Biennial Surveillance Review, September 2002. However, this note is not publicly available.  
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staff would be sent on mission with detailed and carefully crafted instructions and would be 
required to refer matters back to headquarters before agreeing to any deviations from what was 
proposed in these instructions29. The result was that both from the IMF and the member state 
perspective there was limited need for formal operational procedures.  Everyone involved in the 
discussions between the IMF and the member state knew and understood the de facto operational 
procedures.
However, following the collapse of the par value system and the expansion in the scope of IMF 
operations that occurred in the course of the 1980s and 1990s the nature of IMF interactions with 
its member states has changed30.  There are at least three changes that are relevant for current 
purposes:
1. The political context with which the IMF must operate has changed. Non-state actors –
corporations, NGOs, civic organizations – have begun to play a greater role in 
international affairs generally and in the work of the IMF in particular. This can be seen, 
for example, in the consultation requirements in the PRSP process, the efforts the IMF 
makes to meet with civil society in its missions to its member states, and in its growing 
informal interactions with civil society over particular policy papers of the IMF. This 
evolving relationship has increased the pressure on the IMF to disclose more information 
and was an important factor in the establishment of the Independent Evaluation Office. 
NGOs and civic organizations, however, continue to criticize the IMF for the lack of 
transparency in its operating procedures.  They argue that they do not fully understand 
how the IMF makes operational decisions and that it appears that its decision making 
process is subject to undue influence from the IMF’s most powerful member states.
  
2. The nature of the IMF’s relations with its member states has changed. Originally the IMF 
was perceived as and operated like a credit union in which all participants were both 
contributors to the fund and users of its services. Thus, all member states understood that 
IMF policy and operational decisions could become directly applicable to them. 
However, this is no longer the case. Today, the rich countries contribute most of the 
IMF’s funds but never use its financial or technical services while the developing 
countries contribute a relatively small portion of its resources but use all its services. In 
addition, the rich countries, both because of the weighted voting structure in the IMF and 
the structure of its Executive Board, are able to control the institution and make 
operational policy for it, even though these policies will never be applicable to them or 
their citizens. The developing countries, who are dependent on the services of the IMF, 
on the other hand find it much more difficult to participate in policy and decision making 
of the IMF. The result of these changes is that a power imbalance has developed in the 
IMF31. In this situation, the lack of formal  comprehensive operational policies and 
procedures becomes a problem that affects the perceived fairness of IMF operations and 
decision making.
3. The scope of IMF operations has expanded dramatically. The IMF, in addition to its 
involvement in monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, is now also involved in 
29 R.H.R. Harper, Inside the IMF: An Ethnography of Documents, Technology and Organizational Action 
(1998) at 175-230 for a description of an IMF mission.
30 See James M. Boughton, Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989 (2001) for a 
history of the International Monetary Fund during much of this period.    
31 See Daniel D. Bradlow, Stuffing New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Troubling Case of the IMF, 3 J. OF INT’L 
BANKING REG. 9 (2001). 
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advising countries and in supporting their efforts to promote better governance, and to 
adopt policies that are geared towards poverty reduction as well as towards macro-
economic stability. The result is that a member state’s Central Bank and Ministry of 
Finance do not have all the necessary information about the issues of interest to the IMF. 
Thus, the IMF needs to interact with a much broader array of governmental and non-
governmental sources if it is to obtain the necessary information, and effectively design 
and implement its operations. All these sources can influence the success of its proposed 
activities. For these additional actors, the lack of clear and predictable IMF operating 
procedures becomes a problem because they do not know the most effective ways to 
engage with the IMF and cannot understand its operational needs. 
The combined effect of these three changes is that the need for formal and comprehensive 
IMF operational procedures has become more urgent. The lack of such procedures is 
undermining the efficacy of the IMF and even threatening its legitimacy. 
B. Situation in The World Bank32
The World Bank, unlike the IMF, has formal operational policies and procedures to guide its staff 
in the conduct of their responsibilities. Both of these are contained in the Bank’s Operational 
Manual33 which is available at the Bank’s website. It addresses such issues as the types of 
products the Bank offers, the procedures Bank staff should follow in developing their country 
assistance strategies and other analytical work, the procedures they should follow and the factors 
they should consider in their project and loan preparatory work, the environmental and social 
safeguard policies of the Bank, the procedures applicable to loan disbursements and repayments 
and the staff’s responsibilities in monitoring Bank-funded projects. 
The Bank’s operational policies and procedures consist of a number of different documents. 
They are34:
1. Operational Policies (OPs): These are short, focused statements that are drawn from the 
Bank's Articles of Agreement, the general conditions, and policies approved by the 
Board. They establish the parameters within which Bank operations must be conducted 
and describe the circumstances under which exceptions to these policies are admissible 
and who can authorize such exceptions. In the terminology of this paper, the OPs are the 
Bank’s operational policies.
2. Bank Procedures (BPs): These are statements explaining how Bank staff should 
implement the policies set out in the OPs. They spell out the procedures and 
documentation that the staff is required to obtain. One of their purposes is ensure 
Bankwide consistency and quality in the implementation of the OPs. In the terminology 
of this paper, the BPs are the Bank’s operational procedures.
32 The “World Bank” refers to the members  of the World Bank Group. The members of this group are the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development 
Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes.  
33 The Operations Manual can be viewed at www.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf. This 
manual is only applicable to the IBRD and IDA. However, many of its policies and procedures have been 
incorporated into the operational policies and procedures of IFC and MIGA.]See websites: www.ifc.org; 
www.miga.org 
34 These descriptions are drawn from the definitions of these documents contained in the Operations 
Manual, id.
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3. Good Practices (GPs): They contain advice and guidance for staff on implementing the 
OPs. The GPs contain information on such matters as the history of the issue being 
addressed in the OP, the sectoral context within which the OP is being implemented, the 
analytical framework that has informed the substance of the OP, and they provide some 
best practice examples. 
4. Operational Directives (ODs): The ODs contain a mixture of policies, procedures and 
guidelines. They are gradually being replaced by OPs, BPs and GPs.. 
5. Operational Memoranda (Op. Memos): These are interim instructions designed to 
elaborate on issues raised in OPs/BPs or ODs. Once the instructions in Op. Memos are 
incorporated into revisions of the pertinent OPs/BPs, the Op. Memos are retired.
OPs, BPs and ODs, which are contained in the Operational Manual, are mandatory and staff are 
expected to comply with their terms in all their operational activity. GPs and Op. Memos are not 
mandatory and may not be in the Operational Manual. 
The Bank has established a number of independent mechanisms for monitoring and ensuring 
staff compliance with these operational policies and procedures35. They are:
1. Operations Evaluation Department(OED)36: The OED is responsible for evaluating 
completed Bank projects and for offering the management insights into the strengths and 
weaknesses in Bank operations. Its activities may lead it to recommend changes in Bank 
operating policies and procedures.
2. Inspection Panel(Panel)37: The Panel, whose jurisdiction is limited to IBRD and IDA 
operations,  is authorized to receive requests from any groups of two or more persons 
who claim that they have been or are threatened with harm by the Bank’s failure to act in 
compliance with its operational policies and procedures. The Panel is authorized to 
investigate these complaints and make recommendations to the Bank’s Executive Board 
on how to correct the problems caused by Bank non-compliance with these policies and 
procedures. 
3. The Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO)38: The CAO’s jurisdiction is limited to the 
social and environmental aspects of IFC and MIGA operations. It is authorized to deal 
with complaints received from persons who claim they have been or are threatened with 
harm caused by IFC or MIGA funded operations, to monitor compliance with IFC and 
MIGA social and environmental standards and operational procedures and to give the 
management of these institutions advice on the social and environmental aspect of its 
operations. 
The Bank’s personnel policies and procedures have a similar structure to the IMF. It has a staff 
manual that informs staff about their rights and responsibilities. In addition, the Bank, like the 
IMF, has an Administrative Tribunal, an Ombudsman, and an Ethics Officer. Their powers and 
procedures are similar to those of the corresponding bodies in the IMF. 
35 In the case of the IBRD and IDA these independent mechanisms are in addition to the Operations Policy and 
Country Services Vice Presidency, which is responsible for strengthening  management systems for monitoring 
compliance. See World Bank, Quality Assurance Group, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/QAG/0,,pagePK:109619~theSitePK:109609,00.html. 
36 World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department, available at http://www.worldbank.org/oed/.  
37 World Bank, The Inspection Panel, available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf. 
38 Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ev.php
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C. Situation in Regional Development Banks39 
The African, Asian and Inter-American Development Banks  and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development follow similar approaches to the World Bank. This means that 
they each have operational policies and procedures to guide their staff in the conduct of their 
operations. All four have an evaluation department that helps monitor the implementation of 
these operational policies and procedures. In addition, the Asian, and Inter-American 
Development Banks and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development have 
inspection mechanisms to monitor compliance with these policies and procedures and to deal 
with the harm that they cause40. Finally, each of the regional development banks has personnel 
policies and mechanisms for dealing with grievances that may arise under them. 
III. Designing a Formal and Comprehensive Set of Operational Policies and Procedures   
for the IMF
The previous section makes clear that the IMF is an unusual international financial institution 
(IFI) because it does not have a set of formal and comprehensive operational policies and 
procedures.  There are two possible explanations for this difference. The first is that the IMF’s 
lack of such procedures is attributable to the significant operational differences that follow from 
the macroeconomic focus of the IMF’s responsibilities and the MDBs’ emphasis on project 
lending. However, this is not an adequate justification for the IMF’s lack of a formal set of 
operational procedures. The scope of the IMF’s interactions in those member state’s that use its 
services tends to be no less diverse or complex than the interactions of the MDBs in these 
societies. In addition, the impact of an IMF operation on a particular state tends to be stronger 
than the impact of most MDB operations on the same state. Consequently, it has the same need 
for transparent and predictable procedures to guide the conduct of staff and management as the 
MDBs. 
The second possible explanation is that the costs to the IMF of having formal operational 
procedures are too high. In order to adequately assess this explanation, it is necessary to 
determine both the costs and benefits that such procedures would create for the IMF. 
A. The Benefits 
There are five significant benefits that would accrue to the IMF from having a set of formal 
operational procedures. They are:
1. Effective Guidance for Staff: Formal operational procedures would provide staff and 
management with a clearer understanding of what is expected from them during IMF 
39 For information on the operational policies and procedures of these banks, see 
http://www.iadb.org/exr/english/POLICIES/policies.htm for the Inter-American Development Bank; see 
http://www.adb.org/Development/policies.asp and 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Manuals/Operations/default.asp?p=policies for the Asian Development 
Bank; see http://www.afdb.org/projects/policies_and_procedures.htm?n1=3&n2=1&n3=0 for the African 
Development Bank; see http://www.ebrd.org/about/index.htm for the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development.
40 Asian Development Bank, Inspection Function, available at http://www.adb.org/Inspection/default.asp; 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism, available at 
http://www.ebrd.org/about/policies/irm/irm.pdf The Inter-American Development Bank does not mention 
its Investigation Review Mechanism on its website. 
9
operations. This should facilitate staff accountability and provide a basis for improving 
staff performance. It should educate those with whom they interact on the limits of staff’s 
decision-making authority. This, in turn, could help promote member state “ownership” 
of IMF-funded programs. Finally, these procedures may positively affect staff willingness 
to be innovative by giving them clear guidance on where there is scope for innovation.
2. Predictability in the Conduct of IMF Operations: Formal operational procedures woulc 
provide greater predictability to IMF operations than informal procedures which can 
relatively easily be changed. This will enhance both stakeholder confidence in dealing 
with the IMF and IMF staff confidence in their interactions with outside stakeholders.
3. Transparency in IMF Decision-making and Action: Formal procedures would make it 
easier for outsiders to understand how the IMF does its work and the factors that it 
considers in making its decisions. This should help clarify the scope of IMF 
responsibilities and differentiate them from the responsibilities of member governments 
in their dealings with the IMF. Increased transparency may also reduce suspicion that the 
IMF management is unaccountable and has too much discretion. It may also clarify the 
ways in which the IMF is susceptible to pressure from powerful member states. 
4. Accountability: Formal operational procedures will promote accountability in two ways. 
First, they will give outside stakeholders—member states and non-state actors—a 
principled basis on which to hold IMF staff and management accountable. This should 
help depoliticize the issue of IMF operational accountability for specific operations and 
decisions. Second, formal  procedures will help the Board members to hold IMF staff and 
management accountable. 
5. Lessons Learned: Formal operational procedures will also make it easier for the IMF to 
learn about the actual impact of its operational practices and the strengths and 
weaknesses of its operational policies and procedures and to improve them over time. 
B. The Costs 
The IMF would incur the following costs from having formal operational procedures: 
1. Increased Bureaucratization: Formal operational procedures can result in IMF staff 
developing a cautious approach to their work in which they seek to do everything “by the 
book”. There is also a danger that the rules result in an increase in reporting and 
paperwork requirements that reduce staff productivity. 
2. Loss of Flexibility: It is impossible for the drafters of the procedures to anticipate all the 
situations in which they need to be applied. Thus, the procedures can result in a certain 
loss of operational flexibility because they cannot be easily adapted to specific conditions 
in which they actually must function. This in turn may cause the IMF, once again, to be 
seen as imposing a “one size fits all” approach on its member states.
3. Disincentives for Innovation: Formal procedures can increase the risk that staff and 
management will be sanctioned for being innovative in ways that do not strictly comply 
with strict interpretations of the procedures. Since the issues with which the IMF deals do 
not have clear answers and their resolution requires creativity, any disincentive to 
innovation is a potentially significant cost for the IMF. The cost however is mitigated by 
the fact that it is not in the IMF’s interest for the staff and management to have too much 
scope for uncontrolled innovation and the procedures can establish the limits on their 
scope for permissible ingenuity. 
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C. Balancing Costs and Benefits
There are four reasons why the benefits of having formal operational policies and procedures 
outweigh the costs for the IMF. First, such procedures help outside stakeholders particularly 
those in developing countries, engage more effectively with the IMF. This is  particularly 
relevant useful given that the IMF advocates increased participation in the PRSP process, 
increased country ownership of IMF supported programs and transparency, participation and 
accountability as key elements in good governance for its member states. Second, transparent 
and predictable operational procedures will increase public understanding of the IMF’s 
operations, including of the costs associated with more transparent operating procedures. In fact, 
it is the stakeholders in those member states that are most directly affected by the operations of 
the IMF who currently have the least ability to learn about and understand the operating policies 
and procedures of the IMF and who would benefit most from having formal operational policies 
and procedures. Third, the procedures will promote IMF accountability. Fourth, the policies and 
procedures will improve internal IMF governance at a time when IMF operations are growing 
more complex. All these benefits would be earned in areas where the IMF is particularly weak: 
public confidence and trust in the IMF and the efficacy of its operations is declining and there is 
a growing mismatch between the IMF’s rhetoric on good governance and its own governance 
practices. 
Given these significant gains, the question of whether or not the IMF should adopt a set of 
formal operational rules and procedures seems to boil down to two questions:
1. Can the IMF draft operational policies and procedures that maximize the benefits while 
minimizing the costs associated with such policies and procedures?
2. What should the scope of the policies and procedures be?
Each of these questions is answered below. 
C.1: Drafting Operational Policies and Procedures
The primary drafting challenge is to strike the appropriate balance between the rigidity needed to 
provide stakeholders with the desired predictability and transparency in IMF operations and the 
flexibility needed for management and staff to adapt the policies and procedures to the variety of 
situations in which they must operate. There is no theoretical reason that this cannot be done. In 
fact, it is the type of drafting challenge that government draftspeople confront all the time.
In the IMF’s case the goal is to draft operational policies that are sufficiently detailed that they 
provide all stakeholders with enough predictability and information to understand the policies of 
the IMF and their operational goals when they implement the policies. Thus, the operational 
procedures must identify the categories of information staff need to gather in order to perform 
their operational responsibilities; the factors they should consider, the people they should consult 
and the steps they should follow in making operational decisions. In addition, the procedures 
should clearly explain how staff can seek exceptions to the policies and procedures. There are 
two good models that the IMF could use in this drafting exercise. The first is the IMF’s own New 
Conditionality Guidelines and its Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines41. 
41 Guidelines on Conditionality, supra note 4, Operational Guidance on the New Conditionality Guidelines, 
supra  note 6  . 
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The second is the Bank’s three related operational documents --OPs, BPs and GPs. These 
examples clearly demonstrate that it is possible for the IMF to develop operational policies and 
procedures that combine predictability and transparency in IMF operations with operational 
flexibility. 
C.2: The Scope of the Operational Rules and Procedures
There are two aspects to this issue. First, the operational policies and procedures should address 
how the IMF conducts its operations and makes decisions relating to all aspects of its work. This 
means that they should cover all aspects of IMF surveillance, the design, negotiation and 
implementation of IMF financial programs, IMF technical assistance, policy and analytical work 
and its relations with other organizations. 
Second, the IMF needs to establish a transparent and predictable rule-making procedure that will 
govern how the IMF develops all its operational policies and procedures. The extensive 
consultations that preceded the adoption of the current guidelines on conditionality and of the 
work plan of the Independent Evaluation Office are important precedents in this regard. 
However, in both cases this impressive process was “revealed” to all interested parties, thereby 
leaving interested parties uncertain as to whether these were harbingers of new operating 
procedures or exceptions to the normal procedures granted at the IMF management’s discretion. 
The IMF could enhance confidence in its own governance by establishing  a predictable rule-
making procedure that it will always follow when developing new operational policies and 
procedures. 
IV. The Need for an Ombudsman in the IMF  
In order for operational policies and procedures to be effective they need to be supported by a 
mechanism capable of monitoring and promoting compliance with them. One indication of the 
importance of such mechanisms is that the MDBs either have or are considering establishing an 
inspection mechanism that is empowered to investigate charges of non-compliance with their 
operational policies and procedures42.   
There are a number of benefits that such mechanisms offer to IFIs. First, the 
mechanisms can help raise the profile of the operational policies and procedures within 
the institution. In this regard the experience of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel, is 
instructive. The risk that Bank projects may become the object of Panel investigations 
has increased staff sensitivity to the Bank’s operational policies and procedures and 
their interest in acting in complying with them. In fact, it has led to a phenomenon 
known as “Panel-proofing” a project, which means making sure that the project is 
sufficiently in compliance with the policies and procedures that it will survive any 
challenge in the Inspection Panel. 
42 See World Bank, The Inspection Panel, available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/ipn/ipnweb.nsf; 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) / Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Office of  
Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ev.php; Asian Development 
Bank, Inspection Function, available at http://www.adb.org/Inspection/default.asp; European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, Independent Recourse Mechanism, available at 
http://www.ebrd.org/about/policies/irm/irm.pdf, Inter-American Development Bank, Independent 
Investigation Mechanism, available at http://www.iadb.org/cont/poli/mecanism.pdf;  The African 
Development Bank is expected to establish such a mechanism.
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Second, the mechanism can become a vehicle for solving problems that have arisen in 
IFI operations. Such problem-solving capability offers obvious advantages in terms of 
the quality of the operations of the institution and in term of public relations. The IFC 
and MIGA’s Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) offers the best example of an 
effective problem-solving mechanism. 
Third, the mechanism offers the institution an opportunity for learning lessons about the 
actual impact of its operations. Since these mechanisms are triggered by complaints 
from those who have been most directly affected by the operation, they have a unique 
perspective on the operations of the institution. Consequently, its findings and the 
expertise it develops over time can offer the institution some important insights into the 
strengths and weaknesses of its operations and into what feasible improvements can be 
made to both the policies with which its operations must comply and the procedures that 
it should follow in designing and implementing these operations. 
Fourth, the mechanism is helpful in differentiating the responsibilities of the 
international financial institution from those of other actors in its operations. This is a 
particularly useful benefit for an institution like the IMF which has to be careful to 
avoid unduly interfering with the sovereignty of its member sates. The mechanism, 
whose mandate is limited to monitoring issues arising under the institution’s operational 
policies and procedures, can focus just on the operations of the institution without 
having to investigate the activities and decisions of its member states. The evolution in 
the functioning of the World Bank’s Inspection Panel shows both the sensitivity and 
important of this issue and the ability of such mechanisms to enhance institutional 
accountability without unduly interfering with the sovereignty of its member states43. 
The above suggests that the efficacy of the IMF’s operational policies and procedures 
would be enhanced if it established a mechanism that was empowered to monitor their 
implementation. There are a number of forms such a mechanism could take. For 
example, the IMF could follow the examples of the IBRD and IDA, and the regional 
development banks and establish an inspection mechanism44.  Alternatively, it could 
follow the example of the IFC and MIGA and establish a compliance advisor and 
ombudsman arrangement. A third possibility is to follow the example of many national 
governments and the European Union and appoint an ombudsman 45. 
Based on the experience of all these examples, it is possible to deduce certain general 
principles that should be observed by any IFI interested in establishing a mechanism to 
monitor the implementation of its operational policies and procedures. Any mechanism 
that fails to incorporate these principles is likely to be viewed as deficient by at least 
one of the IFI’s stakeholders – member states; the Executive Directors, management 
43 See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (2d ed. 2000); Daniel D. 
Bradlow, Lessons From the NGO Campaign Against the Second Review of the World Bank Inspection 
Panel: A Participant’s Perspective, 7 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247 (2001). 
44 See, supra, note 40. The United Nations also has an inspection mechanism, although this is not 
triggered by outside complaints. See, United Nations, Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), available at 
http://www.unsystem.org/jiu/.
45 European Ombudsman, available at http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/home/en/default.htm.
13
and staff of the IFI; and non-state actors directly affected by the operations of the IFI 
and their representatives. 
These principles are:
1. Role of Non-State Actors: It is absolutely essential that the mechanism be 
triggered directly by non-state actors who claim that they have been harmed or 
threatened with harm by the failure of the IMF to comply with its operational 
rules and procedures. 
2. Clarity of Purpose: The mechanism can be designed to serve one or more of 
three different functions. These functions are:
a.  Compliance Review: This involves determining if the IFI staff and 
management are satisfying the requirements of all the applicable 
operating policies and procedures in a particular IFI operation. The 
World Bank’s Inspection is a good example of an inspection mechanism 
whose primary focus is compliance review.
b. Problem Solving: This involves resolving problems that arise in the 
course of an IFI operation and that have been identified by affected 
people as causing them or threatening them with harm. The IFC and 
MIGA’s CAO is a good example of a problem solving mechanism. 
c. Lessons Learned: This refers to the ability of the mechanism to 
contribute to the lessons that the IFI can learn about the efficacy of its 
operational rules and procedures. Given its unique perspective, the 
mechanism is in a position to identify trends within the implementation 
of operational policies and procedures that are unlikely to be obvious to 
other IFI actors. This function is not well developed in most of the 
mechanisms in the MDBs. The European Union’s ombudsman is an 
example of a mechanism that performs a “lessons learned” role. 
These three purposes are not necessarily mutually exclusive and it is 
possible for one inspection mechanism to perform more than one of these 
functions. In the case of the IMF, the two most relevant functions will be the 
compliance review and lessons learned function. It is more difficult for the 
mechanism to perform a problem solving function because of the 
complexities and multi-faceted nature of IMF operations. However, this does 
not mean that it should not be given the ability to solve problems when it can 
appropriately do so.  
3. Limited Jurisdiction: The mechanism’s jurisdiction must be limited to any case 
arising out of an allegation of non-compliance by the IFI staff and management 
with the IFI’s operational policies and procedures. This helps ensure that the 
mechanism does not encroach onto the sovereignty of the institution’s member 
states. 
4. User Friendliness: Since the mechanism is intended to be available to those who 
have been adversely affected by the operations of the IFI, its procedures for 
receiving and handling complaints should be as easy for the affected people to 
understand and utilize as possible. One way to make the mechanism user 
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friendly is to limit the number of requirements that a complaint must satisfy 
before the mechanism begins to address the substance of the matters raised in 
the complaint. The Ombudsman part of the CAO is a good example of a user 
friendly mechanism. An example of a mechanism that is not particularly user 
friendly is the World Bank Inspection Panel46. One consequence of its formal 
procedures is that the management of the World Bank has been able to use the 
Panel procedures to challenge the eligibility of complainants and the suitability 
of complaints for investigation. This has forced affected people to rely on 
relatively sophisticated advisors in preparing their complaints. In some cases, it 
has also contributed to an unnecessary politicization of the complaint. 
5. Independence: The mechanism should be independent of the management of the 
IFI and should report directly to its Executive Board. In addition, the terms and 
conditions of employment of the mechanism’s personnel should be designed to 
promote and protect its independence. Finally, the budget of the mechanism 
should support its independence. 
6. Powers of Investigation: The mechanism must have access to all the persons, 
documents, records, and locations that it deems necessary to conduct a complete 
investigation.
7. Impartiality and Competence: This means that the mechanism’s 
recommendations, findings, and conclusions must be supported by facts and, 
well reasoned arguments. In addition, the mechanism’s investigations should be 
sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate that it has gathered all the relevant 
information and has used this information in its reports.  
8. Efficiency and Cost Effectiveness: This means the mechanism should be able to 
deal with complaints relatively quickly and at a cost that does not impose an 
undue burden on the IFI.
9. Effective Management of Issues Presented: This means that the mechanism must 
be able to demonstrate to all stakeholders that its findings and recommendations 
are taken seriously by the IFI and that the IFI will either implement the 
mechanism’s recommendations or explain its failure to do so. One important 
consequence of this principle is that the mechanism should be given the power 
to monitor the implementation of the results of an inspection process. 
10.Transparency: This means that the mechanism must publish the results of its 
investigations and must publish an annual report. 
Application of the Principles to the IMF
Given the complexity of the IMF’s operations, it needs a mechanism that is flexible, efficient, 
effective and easy to use. It also needs a mechanism that can both monitor staff and management 
compliance with its operational policies and procedures and can provide the IMF with a lessons 
learned capability.  The mechanism should also, where appropriate, be able to help those directly 
46 See, supra, note 41.
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affected by the IMF’s decisions and operations either resolve their problems with the staff and 
management, or explain to them why a resolution is not possible. 
The model that is most suited to the IMF’s needs is an ombudsman. Historically an ombudsman 
was created for the purpose of receiving complaints from people who believed that they had been 
harmed by the failure of an institution to comply with its own policies and procedures47. It was 
also expected to report to higher authorities on how well the institution was performing its 
responsibilities and complying with its policies and procedures. An ombudsman was designed to 
be flexible and relatively informal in its approach to the issues brought to it. This means that it 
can perform its function with minimal procedural requirements. The ombudsman is also well 
suited to help educate the institution and the authorities to which it reports on the problems that 
are arising in its operations and on identifying ways in which it can improve its operations.  
The following are the essential characteristics that should be exhibited by an IMF ombudsman 
charged with monitoring its operational policies and procedures: 
1. The ombudsman must be appointed by and report directly to the IMF’s Executive Board. 
He/she should have the status of a senior official of the IMF. 
2. The ombudsman must be given all the indicia of independence. This means he/she should 
not have to report to IMF management or to receive any authorization from management 
regarding its budget or personnel decisions, He/she must be appointed to a single non-
renewable term of office from which he/she can only be removed by the Executive Board 
for cause. The ombudsman should also have full control over all staff appointments in the 
ombudsman’s office, and assured budgetary support. 
3. The ombudsman must be able to receive any complaint relating to the IMF’s operations 
from any person who believes they have been or are threatened with harm caused by the 
failure of IMF staff or management to comply with the IMF’s operational policies and 
procedures. 
4. The ombudsman must have the exclusive power to review the complaint and to decide 
whether to investigate the complaint or to reject it.
5. If the ombudsman decides to accept the complaint for investigation, he/she must have 
complete powers of investigation, which includes access to all the IMF staff and records 
that he/she deems relevant to the investigation.
6. The ombudsman must be required to make a report, which is publicly available, to the 
Executive Board for each case for which he/she conducts a full investigation. 
7. The ombudsman must publish an annual report in which he/she must report on all the 
complaints he/she received and on how they were handled. In addition, the ombudsman, 
in the annual report, must comment on the lessons he/she believes can be learned about 
the IMF’s operational policies and procedures from the cases he/she has received and, if 
appropriate, make suggestions on how to improve these rules and procedures. 
8. The ombudsman must have the authority to monitor the implementation of the outcome 
of any investigations he/she conducts. 
Example of Operation of IMF Ombudsman
47 For information on ombudsmen generally, see Ibrahim al-Wahab, The Swedish Institution of Ombudsman 
(1979); World Bank, PREM Notes, No. 19, April 1999, Using an Ombudsman to Oversee Public Officials, 
available at http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote19.pdf.
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The following example may help clarify the benefits that an ombudsman could provide to the 
IMF: Assume that the IMF has proposed that a country seeking its financial support cut its 
budget deficit as a condition for this support.  Under the current situation, groups opposing the 
government’s proposed cuts to government expenditures or proposed increased taxes could not 
easily establish whether the government alone shares responsibility for this action or if the IMF 
staff share some of the responsibility because, for example, they failed to consult all relevant 
parties or failed to take certain pertinent information into account in establishing the challenged 
condition. This is because these groups could not easily determine if the IMF staff have complied 
with IMF operational policies and procedures in establishing this condition (which would set out 
with whom the staff should consult and the variables that the IMF should consider in making its 
conditions) and would have no formal channels through which to address their concerns about 
the IMF staff.  The result may be that the groups will either politicize their concerns so as to get 
the attention of the IMF Board of Director or that they will work to undermine the government’s 
policy, thereby, also undermining the potential success of the IMF’s operation. 
If there were formal IMF operational policies and procedures and an IMF ombudsman, the 
affected groups could determine whether or not the IMF staff had complied with the applicable 
policies and procedures and could bring their concerns to the ombudsman. This person could 
then review the record to determine if the IMF complied with its operational policies and 
procedures. If he/she determined that there was compliance, he/she could provide the 
complainant and the IMF Board and management with a reasoned explanation for his/her 
finding. Alternatively, if the ombudsman found there was non-compliance, he/she would provide 
the IMF Board, the management and the complainants with a reasoned explanation for this 
finding. This would allow the Board, based on a well reasoned record and finding and the 
management’s response to this record, to decide, based on the merits of the case, how they wish 
to address the situation. In either case, the findings of the ombudsman would assure the 
complainants that there concerns had been addressed on their merits at a high level in the IMF. 
While this may not bring them their desired outcome, it should satisfy them that their concerns 
have been taken seriously and that they have been treated fairly by the IMF. 
This example highlights a number of important points. First, the ombudsman’s mandate is 
limited to reviewing the IMF staff and management’s compliance with the IMF’s formal 
operating policies and procedures. He/she cannot comment on the actions of the government 
concerned. Second, the ombudsman’s authority rests only on his/her persuasive powers, as 
he/she has no independent powers of enforcement. Thus, the efficacy of the ombudsman depends 
on maintaining the confidence of all relevant stakeholders—both those inside and outside the 
IMF. It is for this reason that the independence of the ombudsman from all stakeholders is of 
such critical importance. Third, the ombudsman’s findings and decisions will help provide all 
interested persons with empirical data on the actual implementation of its operational policies 
and procedures. These lessons can help contribute to both their improvement over time and to 
better understanding among all interested parties about the challenges the IMF faces in its 
operations. Fourth, there is no part of the current IMF structure that can readily play the role of 
the ombudsman, eventhough there are two existing units that play a role in policy review and 
evaluation. The Policy Development and Review Department, both because it reports to 
management and because of its role in developing policies is not a credible independent monitor 
of the implementation of the policies it develops and helps review. The Independent Evaluation 
Office, under its current mandate has the requisite independence but is limited to reviewing 
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completed operations. Consequently, without an expansion of its mandate, it cannot deal with 
cases arising from ongoing operations, which would be the normal source of cases for an IMF 
ombudsman.  
V. Conclusion  
The complexity and range of IMF operations has grown to the point where it is no longer 
feasible for it to limit its interactions in its member states to officials in the Central Bank and the 
Ministry of Finance in those countries. It now regularly consults with a broad range of 
government officials, legislatures and actors in civil society in those member states that utilize its 
services. This means that the number and range of actors with which the IMF is engaged as 
grown beyond the point where its operating practices can be kept informal and known only to a 
relatively small number of experts. Consequently, it needs to develop a set of operational policies 
and procedures to guide its interactions with all these actors and to guide its decision making. 
The lack of a comprehensive set of such policies and procedures renders IMF operations unduly 
opaque and undermines stakeholder confidence in its fairness and impartiality. 
While the creation of such operational policies and procedures do impose some costs on the IMF, 
they can be minimized through the policy and procedures design and drafting process. In 
addition, these costs are more than compensated for by the benefits that they will bring to the 
institution. 
It is not sufficient for the IMF to merely promulgate such policies and procedures. It must 
support the implementation of these operational policies and procedures by establishing an 
independent ombudsman with the authority to investigate complaints from directly affected 
people and groups about staff and management non-compliance with the policies and 
procedures. 
Both of these steps are required if the IMF is to demonstrate that it practices what it preaches 
about good governance.
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